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1 Abstract
A modern wide area monitoring system (WAMS) supporting the future grid will
include a vastly improved information and communications functionality that al-
lows service providers to sense, monitor, and manage electricity flows throughout
the grid [1]. While the cyber physical integration improves the performance and
efficiency of the grid, it increases its vulnerability to potential cyber-attacks. Se-
curity of cyber-physical systems in the context of the power grid has received
significant attention [2] - [4]. In this Master’s Thesis, we provide two sets of tests
for the existing detection scheme which address the problem of cybersecurity in
smart grid networks involving PMUs (Phasor Measurement Units) taking into
account the dynamical nature of the power system [5].
A PMU can record synchrophasors at a high sampling rate, and the measure-
ments are synchronized to an absolute time reference provided by the GPS. In
general, a GPS spoofing attack refers to deception of the GPS receiver by trans-
mitting spurious signals resembling the normal GPS signals, leading to timing
synchronization errors [6]. In an electric grid with PMUs, GPS spoofing results
in counterfeit time stamps at the synchrophasors and is referred to as a timing
synchronization attack (TSA) [7]. While a TSA only alters the time stamps with-
out inducing changes in the actual measurements, it results in confusing the grid
command center with erroneous system operation status. Evaluating the threat
to synchrophasor measurements and the countermeasures to combat TSAs have
received considerable attention in the existing literature [8]- [11].
In this Master’s Thesis, we propose two sets of tests for the existing GPS
spoofing attack detection scheme [5] to check the performance of the scheme under
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different circumstances. In the first sets of test (α test), we simulate the 9−bus,
3−generator IEEE power system in MATLAB and using this simulated system,
we apply our test for checking the performance of detection scheme. In the other
word, in the α test, we use the simulated data and test the detection scheme. We
will investigate the performance of the detection scheme due to changes in attack
parameter (which is the time delay made by attacker to spoof the authenticated
GPS signal), window size (which is the number of sample in a window we want to
check), and examine the performance in the case of unknown time of attack (which
means that the time of attack is not known in the detection scheme). The second
half of the thesis is dedicated to the second sets of test (β test), in which we use
the data from Real-Time Renewable Microgrid Test-bed lab at Lehigh University.
The key difference between α and β testing is the data used for the test. In the
α test, data comes from the simulated power grid in MATLAB and in the β test,
the data comes from one of the labs at Lehigh.
2
2 Introduction on α Testing
In this section, we document the alpha testing on our algorithm for detecting
the time synchronization attack on phasor measurement units (PMUs). First, we
will describe the system we used for the testing. Then, the performance of our
algorithm will be analyzed for the different attack parameters (β) and window sizes
(number of samples). With larger β or larger window sizes, the detection algorithm
performs better. Our goal is to show that even with small β and small windows,
our algorithm can detect the attack with the large probability. In particular,
we find the minimum window size for which the detection algorithm provides
acceptable detection performance for the smallest value of β we must consider.
We also provide performance for cases where the time of attack is unknown and
we need to estimate both β and time of attack.
3 System Description
We conduct experiments on the 9−bus 3−machine Western System Coordinating
Council (WSCC) test case with the state space model specified in [12] to demon-
strate the effect of a TSA and to verify the performance of the hypotheses test.
Figure 1 is a block diagram of this system. We assume a PMU is located at each of
the generator nodes. Although simultaneous TSAs on several PMUs are possible,
in the experiments, only the PMU on node i = 1 is attacked. The results are based
on 500, 000 Monte Carlo simulations. First we linearize our system model around
an operating point as described in [13]. Let S0 denote the output matrix of this
linearized state space model [14]. In the linearized state space model, we choose
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the covariance matrices Cw,t (the covariance matrix for the noise vector in input-
output equation) and Cv,t (the covariance matrix for the noise vector in dynamical
equation) to be diagonal with identical diagonal elements of (0.01)2. The dynamic
state estimation (DSE) procedure is implemented by employing the discrete-time
Kalman Filter (KF) for t = 0.1 to 10s at a sampling rate of 100 samples/s.
Figure 1: This WSCC 3 Machine, 9 Bus Test Case (known as P.M Anderson
9 Bus) represents a simple approximation of the Western System Coordinating
Council (WSCC) actual implementation.
4 Effect of the attack parameter, β
At the time instant t = 5s, we induce a TSA by setting the attack parameter
at node 1 equal to 8.33ms and the attack parameter for all other nodes equal
to 0 (βi(tc) = b1 = 1/2fc = 8.33ms for i = 1 and βi(tc) = 0 for i not equal
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to 1, where fc = 60Hz is the grid frequency, βi represents the attack parameter
at the ith node, and tc is the time instance in which attack happened), which
alters the measurement matrix of the model. After the attack, the KF continues
to update the state estimate on receiving a new observation yt as xˆt|t = ˆxt|t−1 +
Kt(yt − S0xˆt|t−1) (Kt: Kalman gain) when the output matrix S0 has changed to
Sc = MS0 where M is described in [ref to our conf paper]. The performance of the
filtering algorithm is assessed by plotting the root mean squared error (RMSE) of
the estimated state variable as a function of time. The RMSE for the rotor angle
∆δi at time t is given by
RMSE∆δi,t =
√√√√ 1
L
L∑
`=1
(
∆ˆδ
`
i,t −∆δ`i,t
)2
, (1)
where ∆ˆδ
`
i,t and ∆δ
`
i,t denote the estimate and the true value, respectively, of the
rotor angle at time t in the `th Monte Carlo simulation, and L is the number of
runs used in Monte Carlo simulations. The RMSE for the internal voltage ∆Ei of
the ith generator is defined analogously.
In Fig 2, we plot the RMSE of the rotor angle of the synchronous generator at
node 1 as a function of time. It can be seen that, at t = 5s there is a clear jump
in RMSE which is not present under normal operating conditions. These jumps
may be dangerous, rendering the state estimation useless. A similar behavior is
observed in the plot of the RMSE of the internal voltage of the generator at node
1 as shown in Fig 3. When β1(tC) = b1 these jumps can be easily perceived.
However, when the magnitude of the TSA is small, say β1(tc) = b2 = 0.1b1, (refer
Fig 2, Fig 3) the change in the state estimates is hard to perceive, and still we
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Figure 2: RMSE of the rotor angle ∆δ1 of the synchronous generator 1 when the
TSA is induced at time of attack equal to 5s (tc = 5s). β1(tc) = b1 or b2 where b1 =
8.33ms and b2 = 0.833ms are chosen as two TSA parameters.
show the proposed detection scheme can efficiently decide whether the system is
under attack or not.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed detection scheme, we generate
the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) shown in Fig 4. To plot the ROC, we
choose a range of false alarm rates equally spaced within [0, 0.1]. The threshold
is picked by inspecting the empirical cumulative distribution function of the test
statistic under hypothesis H0. The threshold then is applied to the test, and the
detection rate and the false alarm rate are tabulated. The ROCs are plotted
for some different attack parameters, β1(tc) = b3 = 0.133ms, β1(tc) = b4 =
0.186ms, β1(tc) = b5 = 0.239ms, and β1(tc) = b6 = 0.292ms to demonstrate that
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Figure 3: RMSE of the internal voltage ∆E1 of the synchronous generator 1 when
the TSA is induced at tc = 5s. β1(tc) : b1 = 8.33ms or b2 = 0.833ms are chosen
as two TSA parameters.
the detection scheme fares better with the increase in the magnitude of attack
parameter. In the literature time shifts smaller than 0.013ms are said to occur
due to normal operation and they do not cause significant problems. Thus such
small changes do not be detected. We also compare the ROC performance of
the proposed test with the unrealizable (since β unknown) Likelihood Ratio Test
(LRT). The LRT test in which β1(tc) is assumed to be known gives an upper
bound on the ROC of any test, including the GLRT. In all the tests shown in Fig
4, the ROCs for the GLRT are close to those for the LRT.
7
Figure 4: The ROCs for the proposed GLRT compared to the ROCs for the
unrealizable LRT for attack parameters, b3 < b4 < b5 < b6
5 Effect of the Window Size
By increasing the window size, more samples will become available to better char-
acterize the attack and reduce the impact of noise. On the other hand, there
is a trade off between having a better detection and needing more samples that
consumes a delay in making the decision. In this section, our goal is to find the
minimum window size for which the algorithm can detect TSA even with small β.
Therefore, we provide the ROCs for a different window sizes.
8
Figure 5: The ROCs for the proposed GLRT compared to the ROCs for the
unrealizable LRT for attack parameter equal to 0.278ms and different window
size: N1 = 100, N2 = 80, N3 = 60, N4 = 40
6 Unknown Time of Attack
In all the work we have done so far for detecting the TSA on smart grid, we
assume that the time of attack is known and the only unknown parameter is β.
In this section, we provide simulations in which time of attack is also unknown;
thus, the algorithm should estimate β and time of attack. It is not surprising
that the results show the unknown attack time will degrade performance but the
degradation is not very large.
9
Figure 6: ROC for the proposed GLRT for Unknown Time of Attack compared to
the ROC for the unrealizable LRT for attack parameter β = 0.236ms and window
size = 200 , 100
10
7 Introduction on β Testing
In this section, we document the beta testing of our algorithm for detecting a
time synchronization attack (TSA) on phasor measurement units (PMUs). In
this section we explain the theoretical background of the algorithm which will be
tested. Then, in the following sections, we will describe the testbed, our scenario
for testing, metric of the successful test, and finally in the last section provide the
results to show the algorithm passes this beta testing successfully.
The power system comprising generators, electrical loads and the transmis-
sion network is modeled using differential and algebraic equations. At the ith
generator, the rotor angle (δi), the rotor speed (ωi) and the internal voltage (Ei)
of the synchronous generator are the state variables of the system governed by
differential equations, while the nodal voltage magnitudes (Vi) and the phasor
angles (θi) are the algebraic variables. To analyze the system’s behavior we
consider the 3rd-order differential equations, which can sufficiently capture the
dynamics of state variables [5], [15]. We consider an n-bus, m-generator sys-
tem (in our testing we use 9−bus, 3−generator) where the state vector of the
linearized model for synchronous generator i = 1, . . . ,m is denoted by ∆xi =
[∆δi,∆ωi,∆Ei]
T. The state ∆xi captures the change of the i
th generator’s vari-
ables around an operating point, which depends on the network topology, gener-
ator parameters and the load. We model the evolution of the 3m× 1 state vector
∆xt = [∆x1,∆x2, . . . ,∆xi, . . . ,∆xm]
T by
∆xt+1 = A∆xt + vt, (2)
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whereA is the 3m×3m (for the 3rd-order model) state transition matrix. The 3m×
1 state transition noise vector vt is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d) and Gaussian with 3m × 1 zero mean vector and 3m × 3m
covariance matrix Cv,t. Noise is present in most sensor measurements but we can
model accurate sensors with very small noise power also.
The ith PMU records the voltage magnitude Vi and the phasor angles θi, while
the rotor speed ωi is typically measured using a separate sensor and is incorporated
into the measurement equation. Thus, before subtracting out the steady state, we
have Vri = Vi cos(θi) and Vji = Vi sin(θi). The 3m × 1 measurement vector at
time t is the deviation of the measurements from steady state measurement values
denoted by ∆yt = [∆y1,∆y2, ... ,∆yn]
T where ∆yi , [∆Vri,∆ωi,∆Vj i]T. The
measurements are related to state by the model
∆yt = S∆xt +wt, (3)
where wt is the 3m×1 measurement noise vector assumed to be i.i.d and Gaussian
with zero mean vector and 3m × 3m covariance matrix Cw,t. We will detect the
TSA based on observing ∆yt over a window.
In this section, we show how a TSA alters the measurement matrix S in
(3). The voltage represented in complex phasor form at generator i is given by
V˜i = Vri + jVj i, where Vri and Vj i denote the real and imaginary components,
respectively. A time synchronization attack on a PMU at node i, with time change
denoted by βi(tc), modifies the instantaneous nodal voltage signal by introducing
12
a phase change
V˜i(t+ βi(tc)) = Vi(t+ βi(tc))× cos [2pifc(t+ βi(tc)) + θi(t+ βi(tc))] , (4)
where tc denotes the time instant of the spoofing attack. Assuming normal steady
state operation before attack so that the unattacked version of (4) can be approx-
imated as narrow-band (slowly varying Vi and θi over time), the synchronization
delay attack changes the model by adding a factor 2pifcβi(tc) to the phase at time
tc, where fc denotes the nominal operating frequency of the system. The voltage
phasor after a TSA can be written as V˜i = Vi∠(θi+2pifcβi(tc)) = V¯ri+ jV¯ji, where
∠(·) denotes the phase. We thus have
V¯ri = Vi cos(θi + 2pifcβi(tc))
= Vi cos(θi) cos(2pifcβi(tc))
−Vi sin(θi) sin(2pifcβi(tc))
=Vri cos(2pifcβi(tc))− Vj i sin(2pifcβi(tc)) (5)
V¯ji = Vi sin(θi + 2pifcβi(tc))
= Vi sin(θi) cos(2pifcβi(tc))
+Vi cos(θi) sin(2pifcβi(tc))
=Vji cos(2pifcβi(tc)) + Vri sin(2pifcβi(tc)), (6)
which is compactly written as
 V¯ri
V¯ji
=
cos(2pifcβi(tc)) − sin(2pifcβi(tc)
sin(2pifcβi(tc)) cos(2pifcβi(tc))

 Vri
Vji
. (7)
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Subtracting out the steady state of (7) results in
∆V¯ri
∆V¯ji
=
cos(2pifcβi(tc)) − sin(2pifcβi(tc)
sin(2pifcβi(tc)) cos(2pifcβi(tc))

∆Vri
∆Vji
 . (8)
So, the new measurement equation after a TSA is given by
∆y′t = MS∆xt +wt, (9)
where M is the matrix shown in (8).
Now, we describe how to detect a TSA. We present a statistical hypotheses
testing procedure to detect changes in the measurement matrix in the event of
a TSA. We denote the before attack matrix S as S0. Let us suppose that a
TSA has been initiated at the time instant tc, leading to an alteration of the
measurement matrix S0. Initially assume tc is known. We denote the attacked
measurement matrix as Sc ,MS0 (see (9)). Given the set ∆yt , {∆y1, . . . ,∆yt}
of measurements, the problem is formulated as one of devising a statistical testing
procedure to detect the change in the measurement matrix as reliably as possible.
More precisely, we need to devise a test to distinguish between the following two
hypotheses:

H0 : Given ∆y
t,S = S0, t = 0, . . . , T − 1
H1 : Given ∆y
t,S =

= S0, t = 0, . . . , tc − 1
= Sc 6= S0, t = tc, . . . , T − 1.
The hypotheses test involves comparing a test statistic Λ to a threshold ρ.
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We adopt the Neyman-Pearson (NP) criterion which maximizes the probability of
attack detection for a fixed probability of attack false alarm. Let p(∆yt|∆yt−1;S0)
denote the probability density function of observing ∆yt in (9) at time given t.
Given ∆yt−1 was observed at time t− 1 when the measurement matrix S is S0.
We use similar notation when S = Sc. The NP test statistic, called the likelihood
ratio, is given by
Λ =
p(∆yT |∆yT−1;Sc)× · · · × p(∆ytc+1|∆ytc ;Sc)
p(∆yT |∆yT−1;S0)× · · · × p(∆ytc+1|∆ytc ;S0)
. (10)
If we assume knowledge of the time instant tc when the spoofing attack is
launched, there results provide upper bounds on the performance of hypotheses
tests where tc is unknown and has to be estimated. If tc is unknown, one can
consider a finite time-window and look for a value of tc which maximizes the
likelihood function. This is like using a maximum likelihood estimator for tc. This
is an accepted approach called the generalized likelihood ratio (GLRT) approach.
The GLRT statistic is given by
Λ=
max
β
[p(∆yt|∆yt−1;Sc)× · · · × p(∆ytc+1|∆ytc ;Sc)]
p(∆yt|∆yt−1;S0)× · · · × p(∆ytc+1|∆ytc ;S0)
. (11)
The conditional probability density function p(∆yt|∆yt−1;Sc) is given by
p(∆yt|∆yt−1;Sc) =
exp
{−1
2
(∆yt − µt)TΣ−1t (∆yt − µt)
}
(2pi)K/2|Σt|1/2 , (12)
where µt , E[∆yt|∆yt−1] = ScAS−1c ∆yt−1 is the mean vector and Σt , Cov[yt|∆yt−1] =
ScAS
−1
c Cw,t−1 (ScAS
−1
c )
T
+ ScCv,tS
T
c +Cw,t is the covariance matrix.
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8 Testbed Configuration
We conduct experiments on the 9−bus 3−machine Simulated Power System in the
Real-Time Renewable Microgrid Test-bed lab at Lehigh University to demonstrate
the effect of a TSA and to verify the performance of the hypotheses test. Figure
8 shows the equipment used. We assume a PMU is located at each of the nine
nodes. Although simultaneous TSAs on several PMUs are possible, in the beta
tests, only the PMU on node i = 1 is attacked. We did test attacks on multiple
PMUs in alpha testing.
Figure 7: Real-Time Renewable Microgrid Test-bed lab, Lehigh University
The detailed IEEE 9 − bus model is shown in Figure 8. A sixth-order state
space model is used for the generators. The Pi model is used for transmission
lines. As a result, the model can capture the dynamics of the system. [16], [17]
16
Figure 8: IEEE 9 Bus System
A wide variety of power systems can be simulated using the Real-time simulator
at Lehigh University. The simulations can run in real time, generating data that
fully captures the dynamics of the system. A wireless communication link is
established between the Real-time simulator and a PC, transmitting measurements
gathered from the model. Measurements are then received by the PC and fed into
the TSA detection algorithm.
17
Figure 9: Overview of the Testbed Configuration
9 Testing Scenarios
To apply our testing method, first we received time sampled measurements from
the real time simulator where k is the discrete time index. Our measurements
are xi(k) = [δi(k), ωi(k), Ei(k)]
T, xi(k + 1) = [δi(k + 1), ωi(k + 1), Ei(k + 1)]
T,
and yi(k) = [Vri(k), ωi(k), Vim(k)]
T. We have 3 generators i = 1, 2, 3 and we
use 1000 samples in our testing, so k = 1, ..., 1000. To fit the data with a
state space model, we first subtract the steady state value to obtain ∆xi(k) =
[∆δi(k),∆ωi(k),∆Ei(k)]
T, ∆xi(k + 1) = [∆δi(k + 1),∆ωi(k + 1),∆Ei(k + 1)]
T,
and ∆yi(k). Then using 2 and 3, we use a Least-Square method to find A and
S0 [18], [19].
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10 Metric for Successful Test
To demonstrate our algorithm works correctly, we will plot the probability of
detection vs probability of false alarm (attack detected but no attack present) in
the next section. We will see the probability of detection is very close to unity for
all false alarm probabilities. This is proper for a correctly functioning test. We
also compare our performance to the performance for an optimum unachievable
test (Likelihood Ratio Test-LRT) which knows the exact attack. We show our
performance is close to this unachievable test.
11 Results of Beta Testing
Figure 10: ROC curve when attack parameter is equal to 0.279 ms, the window
size is N = 100, and the time of attack is tc = 5s.
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Figure 11: ROC curve when attack parameter is equal to 0.305 ms, the window
size is N = 100, and the time of attack is tc = 5s.
Figure 12: ROC curve when attack parameter is equal to 0.332 ms, the window
size is N = 100, and the time of attack is tc = 5s.
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According to Figures 10, 11, and 12, the algorithm has good performance for small
attack parameters (β = 0.279 ms). Further, by increasing the attack parameter
(β = 0.305 ms, β = 0.332 ms), the detection performance is even better.
Figure 13: ROC curve when attack parameter is equal to 0.332 ms, the window
size is N = 80, and the time of attack is tc = 5s.
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Figure 14: ROC curve when attack parameter is equal to 0.332 ms, the window
size is N = 120, and the time of attack is tc = 5s.
Figures 13 and 14 show the impact of window size on the detection algorithm.
Increasing the number of samples in each case increases the performance of detec-
tion algorithm.
According to our previous testing (α testing) and also by theory, we know that
increasing β or N will increase the detection performance. We observed this in
our tests.
In all of the results that we have presented so far, we know the time of the attack.
Figure 15 shows the ROC for the case where the time of attack is unknown and
we have to estimate it. There is some loss for estimating the time of attack, but
the performance is still good.
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Figure 15: ROC curve when the window size is N = 100 and the time of attack is
unknown.
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